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Abstract: This paper examines the combined effects of population ageing and changes in 
long-term care policy on the housing market. Those needing care prefer to receive it at home 
rather than in institutional settings. Public authorities prefer to provide care in residential 
settings which are generally lower cost than institutional care. The trend away from 
institutional provision towards care at home is endorsed by national governments and by the 
OECD. Nevertheless, as the number requiring care increases, this policy shift will maintain 
the level of housing demand above what it would otherwise be. It will also have distributional 
consequences with individuals less likely to reduce their housing equity to pay for 
institutional care, which in turn will increase the value of their bequests. Empirical analysis 
using the UK Family Resources Survey and the British Household Panel Survey shows that 
household formation effects involving those requiring long-term care are relatively weak and 
unlikely to significantly offset the effects of this policy shift on the housing market and on the 
distribution of wealth.
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I  INTRODUCTION 
Demographic change is affecting almost all developed countries and many developing 
countries. Its most evident characteristic is population ageing. Many countries, including the 
UK, are experiencing a particularly rapid growth in the numbers of "oldest old" – those aged 
85 and above. Many of this group are likely to exhibit symptoms of frailty, a likely 
consequence of which will be increased demand for long-term care. In the UK, the population 
aged 80+ is expected to increase by 82 per cent between 2011 and 2031, from 2.97 million to 
5.42 million (ONS, 2011). The number of disabled older people in households receiving 
informal care at home is projected to increase by 102%, from approximately 1.75 million in 
2005, to over 3.5 million in 2041 (Wittenberg, Pickard et al., 2008). 
Long-term care is provided in a variety of accommodation settings. These include long-stay 
and geriatric hospitals, residential and nursing homes, various forms of sheltered 
accommodation, and private dwellings. This paper argues that the choice between 
institutional care and care provided in a private dwelling has a significant effect on the 
housing market. Increased care provision in private dwellings will, on balance, increase the 
demand for private housing. We argue that, due to market failure in the market for 
institutional care, the public sector plays an important role in determining how those 
requiring care are accommodated. For reasons of cost and welfare, care policy is increasingly 
promoting care provision at home. The change in emphasis from institutional care to care at 
home will have a substantial impact both on the housing market itself and on the distribution 
of personal wealth as the numbers requiring long-term care rises. 
There are three possible housing outcomes following the recognition that an individual is in 
need of care. In some cases care provision at home will not cause any change in housing 
demand. If a house has at least one resident remaining and the resident requiring care enters 
institutional care, there will be no net effect on the demand for private housing. There may 
also be a reduction in demand: if an elderly parent becomes disabled, a child may decide to 
move in with the parent (or vice versa) to provide care at home. If either the parent or child’s 
house is sold as a result of this interaction, the net effect on housing demand is negative. On 
the other hand, if a person living alone receives care at home instead of moving to an 
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institution, the effect is to hold housing demand higher than it would otherwise be. When 
those living alone enter institutional care, their accommodation becomes available for sale or 
rent. If the person receiving care (caree) is a home owner and has to pay for institutional care, 
sale of the house is often required, given that the home is frequently the largest component of 
wealth. Our argument is that this effect predominates over the tendency for households to 
amalgamate following the inception of care needs. 
House sales precipitated by care needs influence the distribution of bequests. If the person is 
cared for at home and the house is not rented, the beneficiaries will inherit the full value of 
the home. If the person is cared for in a residential setting, the beneficiaries receive the value 
of the home net of the costs of care including the accommodation costs which, as we shall 
see, can be quite considerable. Care at home preserves the client’s wealth. Given that care is 
largely provided during the latter stages of life, care at home is ultimately to the advantage of 
the beneficiaries of the caree's estate. The decision about where carees are accommodated 
therefore has distributional implications. If the person is cared for at home, the beneficiaries 
are likely to be the children of the caree. This benefit will be offset by marginally increased 
house prices faced by those purchasing houses. If care is provided in residential 
accommodation, the benefits will take the form of any excess rents earned by the owners of 
the accommodation. These owners tend to be a mixture of private, charitable and public 
sector organisations. 
This market for care accommodation is characterised by uncertainty and information 
asymmetry since most potential consumers of care are likely only to be involved in this 
market during a relatively short period towards the end of their lives. Consistent with poor 
information flows, long-term care insurance markets have had limited success in providing 
wide coverage at affordable rates in most countries. Partly due to the failure of the insurance 
market, many users of long-term care are unable to meet the costs of residential care from 
their income and non-housing wealth. Governments have generally responded by subsidising 
long-term care. Sometimes support is provided on a universal basis – Scotland has a policy of 
“free personal care”. The more common approach is to apply a means test to carees, making 
it free only to those who do not meet some wealth and/or income threshold. Whether 
universally available, or means tested, the public sector is heavily involved in purchasing 
long-term care provision on behalf of a significant share of the population with care needs in 
almost all OECD countries. Thus, the public sector, whether in the form of local, state or 
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central government, is a major purchaser of long-term care, giving it considerable market 
power. 
Another channel of public sector influence comes through its role as regulator, where it can 
impose costs on institutional providers through the imposition of health and safety standards, 
staffing requirements etc. Because similar costs cannot generally be imposed in a domestic 
setting, increased regulation will tend to widen cost differences between institutional care and 
care provided in private homes.  Netten et al. (2005) highlight the effects of the introduction 
of the National Minimum Wage and National Care Standards as contributory factors to a 
substantial increase in care home closures in England between 1998 and 2000. 
This paper focuses on the accommodation market for those requiring long-term care. It 
argues that the implications for the private housing market of decisions concerning the 
accommodation in which care is delivered have not been recognised in the literature. It 
suggests that changes in the number of places available in institutional care are susceptible to 
exogenous government influence, which in turn derives from the power of the public sector 
both as a monopoly purchaser and as care regulator. This influences the supply of residential 
or care home places, which in turn affects the demand for private dwellings. If public sector 
actions restrict the supply of institutional care, the demand for private dwellings will increase. 
The importance of this issue will increase due to population ageing and the consequent 
increase in demand for long term care.  
The paper is set out as follows: the next section reviews some relevant literature; the 
empirical section then presents some evidence on the care, household structure and the 
demand for housing. The final section brings out the implications of these arguments and 
concludes. 
II  LITERATURE REVIEW  
The economics literature on long-term care has tended to focus on how care needs are met. 
Unlike health care needs, many long-term care needs can be provided by individuals that do 
not have professional training – such as family and friends. Attention has focussed on how 
household structure and family relationships affect care provision and, in turn, how care 
needs influence living arrangements. The supply of, and demand for, accommodation suitable 
for the provision of care and consequent effects on the housing market have received little 
attention. 
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Much of the economic analysis of provision of unpaid or informal care by family members to 
those with care needs derives from the economic theory of the family (Becker, 1981). His 
original focus was on a “unitary” or “common preference” view of care provision, where the 
members of the family share a common set of preferences. In these models, family assets are 
shared and the size of individual contributions to the common pool is irrelevant. More recent 
contributions such as Hiedemann and Stern (1999) and Engers and Stern (2002) have instead 
developed the analysis of the care decision in a game-theoretic framework. For example, 
Pezzin, Pollack and Schone (2007) focus on the alternative residential arrangements once a 
need for care has been determined. These include (1) residential care, (2) paid for care with 
no care provided by children, and (3) care provided by one, or more, children. The decision is 
set up as a two-stage game. In the first stage, children decide whether to meet with their 
siblings to determine care provision for the parent. Based on their evaluation of the potential 
outcomes including side-payments, children decide whether or not to attend the meeting. If 
they do attend, they bargain over possible care arrangements. Their bargaining strategy is 
partly affected by the extent to which their own utility is influenced by that of the parent. 
A different literature focuses on parent-child location decisions. Konrad et al (2002), in 
describing the “geography of the family”, argue that children may act strategically to change 
the costs of providing care to their parents as they grow older. Children may be concerned 
about whether their parents are receiving adequate care, but would prefer not to provide that 
care themselves. If there are two or more siblings, there is a public good issue, since each 
child would prefer to free ride while the other(s) provide the parental care. Rainer and Siedler 
(2009) confirm that siblings are more mobile than only children. Their empirical support 
comes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). In common with Konrad et al, 
they highlight the role of sibling rivalry as a determinant of caregiving.  
Informal care from family and friends is a very significant source of care in old age.  Such 
relationships can be one-to-one, many-to-one, one-to-many, and may even be reciprocal. 
Informal care improves the health and well-being of carees (Cutler, Gruber et al. 2002), and 
reduces healthcare use and costs (Van Houtven and Norton 2006b). Pickard (2012) shows 
evidence of substitution between nursing home or hospital care and very intense co-resident 
intergenerational care for older people. However, provision of informal care is not without 
cost: carers' health typically suffers as a result of care provision (Schulz, O'Brien et al., 1995, 
Schulz, Mendelsohn et al., 2003, Schulz, Mendelsohn et al., 2003, Martire, Lustig et al., 
 6 
 
2010, Haley, Allen et al., 2002, Haley, 2003, Baumgarten, Lebel et al., 2002, Clyburn, Stones 
et al., 2000, Pinquart and Sorensen, 2003). 
There can be many motivations for providing informal care, from altruism towards family 
members through to expectations of future financial rewards.  Informal care affects 
intergenerational bequests and inter-vivos transfers (Bernheim, Shleifer et al., Norton and 
Van Houtven, 2006). 
There is also an extensive literature on the funding of care, much of this relating to 
underlying care issues. Bell and Bowes (forthcoming) examine whether changes in the 
funding of care in Scotland resulted in changes in the provision of unpaid care. In England, 
there have been a number of reviews of long-term care funding with the aim of finding a 
more sustainable policy framework. The most recent major contribution was Fairer Care 
Funding: Report of the Commission on Funding of Care and Support (2011). One of the key 
political drivers of these reviews has been dissatisfaction with the effects of the costs of 
residential care on the housing wealth of carees. 
Another strand of literature focuses on the living arrangements of those requiring care. This 
includes Börsch-Supan (1989); Börsch-Supan, Kotlikoff, and Morris (1991); Ellwood and 
Kane (1990); Kotlikoff and Morris (1990); Börsch-Supan et al. (1992); Börsch-Supan, 
McFadden, and Schnabel (1996). In the last of these, the authors investigate the factors that 
affect the living arrangements of the single elderly aged between 76 and 102 and argue that 
adverse health indicators for the elderly person is more likely to lead to joint living. 
Care needs may directly affect not only the volume, but also the nature, of housing demand. 
Disabled people may require a different set of services from their accommodation. These are 
often described as "aids and adaptations" and include items such as stair lifts, handrails and 
specially adapted bathrooms. If these demands are unanticipated, those requiring care may 
choose to adapt their existing dwelling or to move to a more suitable dwelling. Heywood 
(2004) argues that housing adaptations have beneficial and/or preventative effects on both the 
physical and mental health of disabled people and their carers. However, Harrison (2004) 
challenges assumptions about the importance of physical housing quality, and suggests 
caution about the beneﬁts of raising physical standards. 
The literature that specifically addresses the interaction of care provision with the housing 
market is relatively sparse. Nevertheless, the literature on care interactions within the 
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household usefully exposes the issues relevant to the effects of care needs on household 
structure. Clearly, these are complex, dynamic and are most probably best addressed in a 
game theoretic framework. Given their complexity, and the structure of the datasets available 
to us, we can only take a reduced form approach to these issues. 
 
III  EMPIRICS 
In this section, we consider some of the empirical aspects of the mobility and accommodation 
of older disabled people, focusing on the way in which this affects their housing 
circumstances. We use employ a simple theoretical model to encapsulate these ideas. 
The demand for long-term care accommodation (DLTC) is a function of the size of the 
population (P), its age-distribution (A), household living arrangements (L) and the health 
status of different age groups (SA). Thus we have: 
  ALTC SLAPfD ,,,  (1) 
The demand can be accommodated in private dwellings (PD) or in institutional 
accommodation (IA). We also assume that institutional care and private dwellings are perfect 
substitutes. In practice, for those with extremely high care needs, institutional care is 
generally the preferred option. A more complex model, allowing for imperfect substitutability 
would nevertheless yield similar results. We have: 
 LTCD PD IA   (2) 
We argue that the public sector has monopoly power over the price of residential care. Ceteris 
paribus, one might have expected that the increase in demand for long-term care associated 
with demographic change would have led to an expansion of institutional care. Yet in the 
UK, the volume of accommodation in institutional care fell between 1990 and 2011 (see 
Figure 1). The main decline occurred between 1995 and 2005, a period when public sector 
purchasers took greater control over the prices paid to residential and nursing homes, partly 
through the use of bulk purchases from private sector providers. In 2005, around 250,000 
places were paid for by local authorities in England alone, a significant proportion of the total 
places available and thus an indicator of their market power. 
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Figure 1: Care Home Places in the UK 1990-2011 
 
SOURCE Laing & Buisson Care of elderly people market survey (2011) 
The decline in care home places coincided with a decline in provision by local authorities and 
increasing dependence on private and voluntary sector providers. This was motivated by a 
period of fiscal austerity during which local authorities substituted expensive in-house 
provision for more cost-effective private or voluntary sector care. In these circumstances a 
simple linear model of the supply of institutional (residential and nursing home) places is:  
 IApaaIA 21   (3) 
where a1 and a2 are parameters and RCp is the exogenous price of residential care.  
The demand for care accommodation in private dwellings is therefore given by: 
   IAA paaSLAPfPD 21,,,   (4) 
The aggregate demand for long-term care is highly inelastic, since has no obvious substitutes. 
In a simple linear formulation, this implies that the effect of care demand on the rental cost of 
care accommodation in private dwellings will be given by: 
   IAAPD paaSLAPfbbp 2121 ,,,   (5) 
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where b1 and b2 are parameters. Thus, the principal influences on the rental price of care 
accommodation in private dwellings are: 
 the size of the population (positively),  
 the age structure of the population (increasing as the populations ages), 
 living arrangements of those requiring care (decreasing in larger households) 
 the health status of the population (decreasing in improving health status) 
 exogenous changes in the supply of residential care home places and 
 increasing in the exogenous price of residential care accommodation 
The remainder of this section is taken up with an investigation of some of these effects. We 
particularly focus on the living arrangements of those in receipt of care. The present and 
future size and age-structure of the population are already well-known. Influences on its 
health status are outside the scope of this paper. For a review see Spiers et al (2005). And 
following the argument above, we treat the parameters influencing the supply of residential 
and nursing home places as fixed exogenously. We begin by reviewing some characteristics 
of older people in the UK using descriptive statistics from the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS)2.  
Thus Table 1 shows statistics by age group for UK households with adults aged 55+ years.  
First, average household size decreases with age. This is consistent with children leaving 
home and with the differential life expectancy of men and women. Second, “formal care” – 
the type of care paid for by public authorities - is received by 4.2% of those aged 55 to 64 
years and 26.5% of those aged over 85.  Older people are much more likely to require care. 
Third, the proportion receiving informal or unpaid care increases from 3.5% for those aged 
55 to 64 to 11.7% for those aged over 85.  Informal care within households is primarily 
provided by spouses for those aged less than 85, although care from children is more likely 
for those aged 85+.  In total, 34.4 per cent of this age group receive care from formal sources, 
informal sources, or both. In addition, some may have an unmet need for care: this is not 
captured in BHPS data. Fourth, the proportion with difficulties that require care grows with 
age. For households with individuals aged 85+, 31.1% have difficulty with housework, 
30.9% with climbing stairs, 12.8% with dressing, and 31.9% with walking.  
                                                 
2
 See Appendix for a description of the datasets used in this paper. 
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Table 1 : Descriptive Statistics for Households with Adults aged 55+  
 
Age of Oldest Householder (Years) 
 
55 to 64 65 to 74 75 to 84 85 plus 
Household Size (No. People) 2.204 1.795 1.491 1.32 
 
(1.045) (0.811) (0.607) (0.588) 
Receives any form of Care 0.074 0.108 0.189 0.344 
 (0.263) (0.311) (0.392) (0.475) 
Receives Formal Care 0.042 0.045 0.113 0.265 
 
(0.201) (0.208) (0.317) (0.441) 
Receives Informal Care 0.037 0.074 0.095 0.117 
 
(0.19) (0.262) (0.294) (0.322) 
Cared for by Spouse 0.032 0.062 0.072 0.045 
 
(0.175) (0.241) (0.258) (0.208) 
Cared for by Children 0.004 0.013 0.02 0.07 
 
(0.065) (0.111) (0.142) (0.255) 
Provides Informal Care 0.212 0.194 0.139 0.067 
 
(0.409) (0.396) (0.346) (0.25) 
Difficulties with Housework 0.074 0.101 0.198 0.311 
 
(0.262) (0.302) (0.399) (0.463) 
Difficulties Climbing Stairs 0.091 0.131 0.227 0.309 
 
(0.287) (0.338) (0.419) (0.462) 
Difficulties with Dressing 0.033 0.038 0.066 0.128 
 
(0.18) (0.191) (0.249) (0.335) 
Difficulties with Walking 0.089 0.128 0.206 0.319 
 
(0.285) (0.334) (0.404) (0.466) 
    
SOURCE: BHPS (1992 to 2008) Standard deviations shown in brackets. Observations are 
weighted using the supplied longitudinal survey weights. 
Next, we examine the household formation characteristics of those with care needs, one of 
the key elements of equation (5). We begin by examining the transitions between single and 
multi-adult households.  Table 2 takes the adult population aged 50 years and over living with 
one or more others people in 2002, showing the proportion by gender who have moved to 
single person households three years later in 2005, and six years later in 2008.  The 
proportion transitioning to living alone increases dramatically with age, and is significantly 
higher for females than males above the age of 60 years. 
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Table 2: Proportion Of Individuals Aged 50+ Years Transitioning Into Single Person Households 
  2005 2008 
  Percentage of Individuals Percentage of Individuals 
  Male Female Male Female 
Age in 2002 Single Multi-Adult Single Multi-Adult Single Multi-Adult Single Multi-Adult 
50-59 13.9 86.1 11.8 88.2 14.0 86.0 11.2 88.8 
60 - 69 11.5 88.5 23.5 76.6 12.5 87.5 20.3 79.7 
70 - 79 22.5 77.5 46.2 53.8 18.7 81.3 40.9 59.1 
80+ 44.6 55.4 70.1 29.9 42.4 57.6 67.8 32.2 
SOURCE: BHPS (2002, 2005 & 2008) All adults aged 50 years and over and not living alone in 
2002. Observations are weighted using the supplied longitudinal survey weights. 
Next, we evaluate the proportion of household containing older people that join, or are joined 
by, their children to form multi-adult households. Table 3 shows the proportion of children 
joining and leaving households between successive waves of the BHPS. This variable is cross 
tabulated with an indicator variable, which measures whether individuals aged 55+ moved 
house between waves. 
Table 3: Proportion Of Individuals Aged 55+ Years Forming And Dissolving Households With 
Children 
  Moved House between Waves 
  No (%) Yes (%) 
Child Leaves House Between Waves   
 No (%) 95.32 3.58 
 Yes (%) 0.94 0.16 
Child Joins House Between Waves   
 No (%) 93.61 3.47 
 Yes (%) 2.64 0.27 
SOURCE: BHPS (1992 to 2008) All adults aged 55 years and over in the year of observation. 
Observations are weighted using the supplied longitudinal survey weights. 
From Table 3, it is clear that the proportion of older people moving house to be with their 
children (0.27%) is much less than the proportion of older people whose children joined their 
household (2.64%). There are flows of similar magnitude on household breakup, with moves 
from the parental home more common than parents leaving the children's home. This 
suggests a very small proportion of older people form new households with their children, 
where the children had previously left the family house. 
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Table 4 shows reasons for moving, again using BHPS data on those aged 55+. The most 
common motivation for moving in this age group is to be closer to the family. Again, a 
relatively small proportion moved in with their family. This suggests that families may come 
closer together as parents age. This may have to do with care, with proximity to 
grandchildren etc. But relatively few actually form new households with their children. 
Table 4: Proportion Of House Movers Giving Reasons For Move 
Reason for Moving 
Proportion of movers aged>55 
years 
Moving closer to family 13.24% 
Moving in with family 4.19% 
Moving due to health 10.93% 
Moving due to stairs 9.02% 
Sample of movers in BHPS 
(n) 1,116 
 
SOURCE: BHPS (1992 to 2008) All adults aged 55 years and over who have moved house since the 
previous wave. Observations are weighted using the supplied longitudinal survey weights. 
 
We next consider the relationship between household size and the need for care. This follows 
a similar argument to that of Börsch-Supan, McFadden and Schnabel (1996). We consider the 
factors that are likely to influence the probability that an older person lives alone. For this 
analysis, we use the Family Resources Survey (FRS) and merge data from 2001 to 2006 to 
generate a large sample of older people and restrict the sample to those aged 70 and over. 
Table 5 shows how the need for care varies by age within our sample. 
Table 5: Population (Thousands) by Age Group and Care Needs 
  
No 
care 
Care 
Needs 
Population share with care 
needs 
70-74 1,707 226 11.7% 
75-79 1,325 285 17.7% 
80-84 888 366 29.2% 
85+ 398 367 48.0% 
Source: FRS 2001-2006 
Clearly care needs increase sharply by age. Among those aged 70-74, only 11.7 per cent are 
carees: among those aged 80+, 36 per cent receive some form of care. Again, this confirms 
the steep increase in the incidence of care needs with age. This is the age group whose 
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numbers in the UK, as mentioned above, will increase by 82 per cent between 2011 and 
2031. 
The impact of care decisions on the housing market is largely driven by older people 
requiring care who live alone. If one spouse moves into residential care, leaving their partner 
in the house, then there is no impact on housing demand.  A transition from solo living to 
living with children reduces the net demand for housing. A switch from living with children 
to residential care has no effect on demand.  The proportion of older people living alone is 
therefore a key determinant of potential effects on the housing market resulting from changes 
in care policy. 
We now form a reduced-form model of the probability that an older person lives alone. As 
dependent variable we construct a binary variable taking the value one when a person lives 
alone and zero when he/she lives in a household of two or more persons. On the right-hand 
side, we include variables measuring whether anyone in the household requires care, real 
household income per capita, age, region and year. If someone requires care, other family or 
friends may co-reside to reduce the transactions costs of delivering care from a distance. 
Higher real household income provides people living alone with more purchasing power to 
buy services that might otherwise be provided by household members. However, higher 
income may also facilitate matching and be associated with longer life expectancy. Hence, a 
priori, the sign on this variable is ambiguous. Probabilities of living alone are likely to 
increase with age and at differential rates by gender due to differing life expectancies. Region 
dummies may capture differences in social mix and geography that influence the probabilities 
of living alone. Finally, a time trend is introduced to capture any general change in the 
preferences of older people over joint or single living. 
Table 6 shows our results. They are derived from repeated cross-sections using the FRS over 
the period 1998-99 to 2009-10. Males and females are estimated separately because 
differences in life expectancy by gender cause a significant gender imbalance at older ages, 
which in turn increases the probability that females live alone.  
For the FRS model, the columns headed dF/dx shows the marginal effects on the probability 
of living alone of each of the explanatory variables. Stars indicate levels of significance. 
Columns to the right show the relevant standard errors. The equations are estimated for those 
aged 50 and above. There are 117 thousand males and 133 thousand females in our samples. 
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Table 6: Determinants of Living Alone at Older Ages 
  Males Females 
  Marginal Effects St. Error Marginal Effects St. Error 
Requires care -0.0291
***
 (0.003) -0.0471
***
 (0.003) 
Income per adult 0.0196
***
 (0.003) -0.0042 (0.006) 
NW and Merseyside -0.0093 (0.005) -0.0112
*
 (0.005) 
Yorks & Humberside -0.0285
***
 (0.005) -0.0178
**
 (0.006) 
East Midlands -0.0374
***
 (0.006) -0.0384
***
 (0.006) 
West Midlands -0.0326
***
 (0.005) -0.0426
***
 (0.006) 
Eastern -0.0546
***
 (0.005) -0.0538
***
 (0.006) 
London 0.0174
**
 (0.005) 0.0041 (0.006) 
South East -0.0539
***
 (0.005) -0.0517
***
 (0.005) 
South West -0.0517
***
 (0.005) -0.0425
***
 (0.006) 
Wales -0.0302
***
 (0.006) -0.0313
***
 (0.007) 
Scotland -0.0117
*
 (0.005) 0.0103
*
 (0.005) 
Age 55-59 0.0141
***
 (0.004) 0.0543
***
 (0.004) 
Age 60-64 0.0251
***
 (0.004) 0.1151
***
 (0.004) 
Age 65-69 0.0504
***
 (0.004) 0.1748
***
 (0.004) 
Age 70-74 0.0748
***
 (0.004) 0.2667
***
 (0.004) 
Age 75-79 0.1366
***
 (0.004) 0.3758
***
 (0.004) 
Age 80-84 0.1887
***
 (0.005) 0.4609
***
 (0.005) 
Age 85+ 0.2828
***
 (0.007) 0.5310
***
 (0.007) 
Trend 0.0031
***
 (0.00) -0.0005 (0.00) 
Bic 111044.3 147911.4 
N 116976 133250 
Pseudo R
2
 0.0332 0.1089 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Source: FRS 1998-99 to 2009-10, marginal effects shown with standard errors, omitted categories: 
region – North, age group – 50-54.  
 
Both for males and females, having someone in the household receiving care reduces the 
probability of living alone. The reduction is quite small - 3% for males and 5% for females. It 
may reflect increased co-habitation in response to care needs, reducing transactions costs 
associated with care provision as well as possibly reducing housing costs. Greater household 
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income increases the probability that men live alone, but has no significant effect on females. 
Men may be prepared to make greater use of the independence that follows from higher 
income than do women.     
The sharp contrast between the probabilities of living alone for men and women is shown in    
Table 1        Table 7 which gives the predicted probabilities of living alone from the estimates 
set out in Table 6 at different ages.  With other variables set at their sample means, the 
substantial difference in the predicted probabilities of living alone between the group aged 
55-59 and the group aged 85+ are evident. For men, they increase from 0.147 to 0.487, while 
for women they increase even more dramatically – from 0.172 to 0.718. Age effects dwarf 
the impacts of other exogenous variables on the probability of living alone. 
Table 7: Predicted Probabilities of Living Alone by Age Group 
 
Male Female 
Age 55-59 0.147 0.172 
Age 70-74 0.206 0.395 
Age 85+ 0.487 0.718 
Source: Own calculations from regression estimates 
If individuals live alone, they may receive informal care from inside or outside the home, 
which may help them continue to live independently rather than being admitted to 
institutional care. Within multi-adult households, informal care is generally available. 
Spouses provide the bulk of informal care within households. Figure 2 shows the proportion 
providing and receiving informal care within their household by age and gender.  Women are 
more likely to provide informal care than men.  They also provide care at a younger age.  
Men (if they are alive) are more likely to continue providing care into older age. Men are 
more likely to receive care, and later in life than women. 
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Figure 2: Proportions giving and receiving unpaid care by age 
  
Proportion of Adults Providing Unpaid 
Care 
Proportion of Adults Receiving Unpaid Care 
Source: BHPS (2002 – 2008) All adults aged 40 years and over.  Observations are weighted 
using the supplied longitudinal survey weights. 
A further explanation lies in a more detailed analysis of care provision. Caring is a complex 
activity, and individuals’ care needs may involve a mixture of forms of care, with individuals 
receiving different types of support from different sources. The English Longitudinal Study 
of Ageing has a detailed breakdown of forms of care.  Figure 3 shows a breakdown of caring 
activities by source. Non-spousal family members are most likely to be involved with 
activities such as shopping.  More intimate caring, such as washing/dressing is most likely to 
be provided by spouses or through formal/private care. There is also significant unmet need 
for these forms of care. A need for intimate care may reduce the willingness of children to 
form households with parents. 
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Figure 3: Carers and Caring Roles 
 
Source: English Longitudinal Study of Ageing Waves 2-4 (2004 to 200) 
Adults aged 50 years and over in receipt of some form of care.  Population estimates produced using 
the supplied survey weights. 
Children’s role in providing care for parents is restricted mainly to assistance with shopping 
and domestic tasks. It is clear that more personal tasks such as washing and meal preparation 
are largely carried out by spouses. These are the kinds of care in which residential care homes 
specialise. Hence, these data suggest that spousal care is more substitutable for residential 
home care than is the care provided by children. 
Returning to Table 6, regional effects are calibrated relative to the North of England. Most 
regions have significantly lower probabilities of living alone than the North. As mentioned 
earlier, this is likely to reflect differences both in social mix and geography. The only area 
with a significantly higher probability of older males living alone, though not older females, 
is London.  
With the FRS dataset, age is measured using five-year bands. Age effects are calibrated in 
our regression using a set of dummy variables, each corresponding to one of these bands. The 
marginal effects shows that age has a more dramatic effect on the probability of living alone 
than any of the included variables. Thus, for men, the probability of living alone increases by 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
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28% between ages 50-54 and 85+, while for women the increase is a massive 53 per cent 
over the same age range. The increased probability of living alone with increasing age 
reflects both the increased likelihood that a spouse is not present and the relatively low 
proportion of older people in the UK who cohabit with their children, as shown in Table 2.   
Our time trend shows an increasing probability of living alone among older males, but no 
significant trend among females. However the effect is small and therefore not likely to have 
a substantive effect on the housing market even if continued into the longer term. It may 
reflect changes in the process of household formation and dissolution, including the increased 
prevalence of divorce, though it is not clear why only males should be affected. 
Another factor which may increase the proportion of those with care need staying at home 
rather than entering an institution is the possibility that houses may be modified to provide 
for particular care needs. Household adaptations can be an important factor in determining 
whether it is feasible to stay and receive care in one’s own home.  This increases the potential 
supply of care in the home, and reduces the incentive to move to residential care in order to 
access appropriate living environments to address care needs. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the proportion of older people who have made 
adaptations to their home.  The most common are hand rails (14%), bathroom modifications 
(12%) and alerting devices (5%).  These adaptations are concentrated amongst lower income 
households and those living in social housing. More expensive homes may be better designed 
to accommodate the disabled or more affluent carees may choose to move to more suitable 
accommodation. Social housing may also require that adaptations remain after a change of 
tenant, while owner-occupiers may remove such devices when a house is sold.  
The characteristics of the house in which those receiving care reside may differ from private 
houses in general. Household adaptations can be an important factor in determining whether 
it is feasible to stay and receive care at home.  Housing improvements and adaptations make 
housing more suitable locations in which to receive care.  This increases the supply of private 
home care, and reduces the incentive to move to residential care in order to access 
appropriate living environments to address care needs. 
Error! Reference source not found. shows the proportion of older people (those aged 50+) 
who have disability-related adaptations to their home.  The most common are hand rails 
(14%), bathroom modifications (12%) and alerting devices (5%).  These adaptations are 
 19 
 
concentrated amongst lower income households and those living in social housing. Higher 
income households may be better designed for disabled people, reducing the need for 
adaptation. Social landlords may also be more reluctant than owner occupiers to remove 
adaptations, once the immediate need for them has passed.   
 
Figure 4: Proportion of Households with Adaptations 
 
Source: English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
Finally, we consider how the private housing in which care clients reside compares with the 
housing stock in general. One key indicator of housing quality is number of bedrooms. We 
therefore construct a model of the number of bedrooms to see how this relates to care 
provision and to get some idea of the quality of housing that may not be available to the 
market if the supply of institutional care was restricted by market failure.  
Table 8 shows regression models of the number of bedrooms in homes where care is being 
supplied, and in houses where no care is being supplied. The mean number of bedrooms in 
these categories is 1.5 and 2.1 respectively. Care is typically supplied in houses with fewer 
bedrooms. Disability may have restricted past income, reducing the opportunity to acquire 
housing wealth. Care needs may also be associated with occupational hazards and therefore 
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more likely to be associated with lower income individuals with less access to housing 
wealth. 
Our approach is to model the number of bedrooms in a house to determine whether this 
variable is related to receipt of care. The number of bedrooms is distributed over the set of 
positive integers, and conventionally begins at 1. We therefore model the number of 
bedrooms less one, which we characterise as a Poisson distribution. We use the negative-
binomial distribution for estimation because it does not suffer from the constraint imposed on 
the Poisson distribution of equality between its mean and variance.  We separately model 
households in which at least one person has care needs and households where no-one has care 
needs. We use owner-occupation, living alone, real household income per adult and age as 
explanatory variables.  
 Table 8: Determinants of the No. Bedrooms In House 
  No Caree in Household 
  
Marginal 
Effects St. Error 
Marginal 
Effects St. Error 
Owner-occupier 0.681
***
 0.014 0.816
***
 0.010 
Lives alone -0.559
***
 0.015 -0.523
***
 0.008 
Real income 1.106
***
 0.063 0.089
***
 0.004 
Age 55 to 59 -0.077
***
 0.024 -0.074
***
 0.010 
Age 60 to 64 -0.142
***
 0.023 -0.141
***
 0.010 
Age 65 to 69 -0.197
***
 0.023 -0.218
***
 0.010 
Age 70 to 74 -0.219
***
 0.023 -0.247
***
 0.011 
Age 75 to 79 -0.211
***
 0.023 -0.297
***
 0.012 
Age 80 to 84 -0.279
***
 0.023 -0.372
***
 0.015 
Age 85+ -0.235
***
 0.024 -0.419
***
 0.021 
N 154553 
 LR chi
2
(10)        18692 
Pseudo R
2
      0.0412 
Mean Bedrooms 2.080 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
Source: FRS 1998-99 to 2009-10, Excluded category: Age 50-54 
Table 8 shows the results. All variables are significant at a 1 per cent level of significance. 
For non-caree households, the number of bedrooms declines with age. Conditional on other 
variables, those aged 85+ live in houses with 0.42 less bedrooms than those aged 50-54. 
Amongst those receiving care the decline is smaller, at 0.23 bedrooms on average, though 
still significant. These reductions may reflect cohort effects. The relatively old were probably 
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in the labour market at a time when real incomes were lower than the period during which 
those aged 50-54 were working. Owner-occupation may also be correlated with higher 
incomes and consequently with housing wealth. For caree households, owner occupiers live 
in dwellings with 0.68 more bedrooms, while there are 0.82 more bedrooms in non-caree 
houses. Similarly, increased real incomes are associated with more bedrooms. Not 
surprisingly, single-adult households occupy around one-half bedroom less than multi-adult 
households.   
These results suggest that dwellings in which at least one resident has care needs typically 
have fewer bedrooms than those where no care needs are present. Not surprisingly, living 
alone also has a negative effect on numbers of bedrooms. However, the number of bedrooms 
decline less rapidly with age for dwellings with care needs.  Nevertheless, the implication of 
these results is that the houses most likely to be unavailable to the market due to limitations 
in the supply in institutional care have relatively few bedrooms and are therefore more likely 
to be at the lower end of the housing market.   
IV  DISCUSSION 
Over time, policy in the UK towards the accommodation of long-term care clients has 
changed substantially. There was a significant change from care provision in hospital 
geriatric wards to residential or nursing homes between 1983 and 1993, when care home fees 
were “uncapped”. During this period, the government met any care home charges levied on 
carees with insufficient income to meet their care home costs. This caused a sharp expansion 
in the supply of institutional care. Since then there has been a shift in the “balance of care” 
away from such care homes towards care provision at home. Capping of the fees payable by 
local authorities and increased regulation had a dramatic effect on care home provision in the 
UK. Between 1994 and 2007, the number of care home places in the UK fell from 570,000 to 
409,000. This development occurred even though care home provision is overwhelmingly 
focussed on older people and the impact of demographic change was also well understood.     
One of the key arguments in favour of care provision at home is that it enhances welfare for 
most carees, other than those with high levels of need. Thus, the Wanless Review (2006) of 
long-term care provision in England argued that the first of its six priorities for long-term 
care should be “to promote the development of domiciliary, day and respite services to enable 
people to live in their own homes wherever feasible and sensible.” In Scotland, there is a 
National Indicator “to increase the percentage of people aged 65 and over with high levels of 
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care needs who are cared for at home.” The drive for care provision in the private residence 
of the care client is not limited to the UK. OECD policy supports care provision at home: 
“Encouraging home and community care is desirable for users and spending is lower” 
(Colombo, Ana et al., 2011). This trend towards care at home has also been justified on the 
grounds of cost – most care packages provided at home cost significantly less than care in 
nursing or residential care home. The average cost of home care in England in 2005 was 
estimated by the Public Social Service Research Unit at £91.78 for an average of 6.5 hours 
per week. Even a more intensive home care provision of 20 hours per week would cost only 
£284 per week.  This compares to average weekly fees in 2005 for residential care (£397) and 
nursing care (£570) (Laing & Buisson, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the policy debate has ignored the housing market effects of this policy shift. 
These effects are conditional on the household arrangements of carees, particularly whether 
they live alone or with their spouse and/or children. A decision to provide care in a private 
dwelling rather than in an institution has no immediate housing market implications if the 
individual is part of a multi-adult household. If the care client is the sole member of the 
household and has insufficient income to meet the residential home fees, the dwelling may be 
sold to meet these fees. The residue from the client’s estate will ultimately be paid to the 
beneficiaries. This sets up a complex set of incentives, both for carees and their potential 
carers which involves the costs associated with care provision and the uncertain benefits of 
subsequent inheritance. 
We found that the amount of household formation involving parents going to live with 
children, or children forming a household with their older parents, is relatively small. In 
addition, children’s care tends to involve a more restricted set of care tasks compared with 
that provided by spouses or formal care provision. This implies that a household involving 
parents needing care and adult children is a less obvious substitute for institutional care than 
is a household where a spouse is present or where formal care is being provided by the public 
or private sector. For a caree living alone, friends and family outside the household are less 
likely than spouses to provide forms of care such as washing and meal preparation. 
Population ageing will mean that the market in care provision for such tasks may have to 
expand substantially.  
We found that carees are slightly less likely to live alone, but this effect is relatively small 
compared with the sharp age gradient in solo living, particularly among women. We know 
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that age and care needs are positively correlated. The increased numbers of the “oldest old” 
associated with demographic change will tend to increase housing demand, particularly if the 
number of places in institutional care fails to increase due to the effects of regulation and the 
exercise of monopoly power by the public sector.  
The housing market effects of increased demand for care also depend on characteristics of the 
housing occupied by carees. We have found that care and living alone are associated with 
relatively small houses (using the metric of the number of bedrooms). Hence the house 
typically affected by the switch from institutional care to care at home will be somewhat 
smaller than average. One might speculate that this may be a segment of the market that first-
time buyers also seek to occupy. Substitutability between private accommodation for those 
requiring care and the general housing market may be partly limited by the extent of aids and 
adaptations necessary to support care provision. 
Nevertheless, the overall conclusion is that a policy focussing on care at home relative to 
institutional care may enhance the welfare of carees, but it will also have some unintended 
consequences on the housing market. It will allow carees and their beneficiaries to retain their 
housing wealth, while potential investors in institutional care may be deterred due to the 
absence of assured rental streams. 
Finally, consider some of the magnitudes which underlie the arguments put forward in this 
paper. The current projection is that there will be an additional 2.45 million people in the UK 
aged 80+ by 2030. Our estimates suggest that on current patterns of behaviour the majority of 
the women and around 40 per cent of the men will be living alone. Based on the gender 
composition of the projected increase in population, there are likely to be around 1.1 million 
additional singleton households by 2031. We also know that, based on current patterns of 
health, at least 25 per cent of this age group will have a demand for care. In 2010, the UK 
housing stock comprised 27.3 million dwellings. If neither the current stock of dwellings, nor 
the number of places in institutional care increases significantly, around 1 per cent of 
dwellings will be occupied by this particular group of older people, and they will comprise 
only part of the additional stock of individuals requiring care. While care provision at home 
may be beneficial both for the individuals concerned and for those paying such care, there 
may be negative effects due to excess demand in the housing market, particularly at the lower 
end, which will be exacerbated if the price response to the excess demand is non-linear.       
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Appendix – Datasets used in the study 
 
British Household Panel Survey 
The BHPS provides information on household organisation, employment, accommodation, 
tenancy, income and wealth, housing, health, socio-economic values, residential mobility, 
marital and relationship history, social support, and individual and household demographics. 
It was originally designed as a sample of more than 5000 households, making a total of 
10,000 individual interviews.  In this paper we use the longitudinal nature of the BHPS to 
describe changes in household structure and individual characteristics. 
 
Family Resources Survey 
The Family Resources Survey an annual cross-sectional survey of living conditions and 
resources of people across the UK. Currently based on a representative sample of around 
25,000 UK households, it collects extensive information on care, benefits, household living 
arrangements and sources of income. In this paper we use the large cross-sectional sample of 
the Family Resources Survey to estimate regressions household size, both number of persons 
and rooms. 
 
English Longitudinal Study of Ageing 
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing is a panel dataset which incorporates information 
on the economic, social, psychological and health elements of the ageing process. The sample 
size is around 10,000 individuals in England aged 50 and over. Begun in 2002-03, 
respondents are interviewed once every two years. In this paper we use the detailed data on 
informal care in the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing to describe types and sources of 
support provided to older people within their own homes. 
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